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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the audacity of Nietzsche, some have declared “notice pleading is dead.”1   
“Notice pleading,” which has long been the hallmark of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure since their adoption in 1938, requires that a plaintiff need only state 
enough about his or her claim in a complaint to put a defendant on “notice” as to 
what the claim is.  It is true that the text of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure has not changed; a “short and plain statement of the claim” is all that is 
supposedly required for a pleading to suffice.2  Nor has the text of the 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss been altered, which nips a controversy in the bud by preventing a 
pleading from proceeding if the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.”3  But none can deny that when the Supreme Court handed 
down Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly4 in the spring of 2007, the standard for 
pleading and the motion to dismiss had been transformed from the longstanding 
endorsement of notice pleading expressed in the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson.5  In 
Bell Atlantic, the Court abrogated the low-threshold pleading standard outlined in 
Conley, which held that a complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss 
unless the plaintiff could prove “no set of facts” to support his or her claim,6 and 
                                                          
 
1
 A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008) (“Notice 
pleading is dead.  Say hello to plausibility pleading.”); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards 
After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007) (“The best 
reading of Bell Atlantic is that the new standard is absolute, that mere notice pleading is dead 
for all cases and causes of action.”). 
 
2
 FED. R. CIV. P. 8.  In December 2007, a new version of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure went into effect that attempted to clarify the wording and format of the Rules.  No 
substantive changes were made to the Rules.  
 
3
 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 
4
 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 
5
 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  
 
6
 Id. at 45. 
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replaced it with a new pleading standard that required a complaint to be “plausible 
on its face.”7  But what would this change look like in application?  Despite the 
Supreme Court’s second attempt at outlining the parameters of “plausibility” 
pleading in its 2009 decision of Ashcroft v. Iqbal,8 courts, scholars, and professors of 
civil procedure continue to wrestle with whether the vaguely presented “plausibility” 
standard is the death-knell to notice pleading at the federal level.   
Federal circuit and district courts have readily adopted the “plausibility” 
language of Bell Atlantic in interpreting motions to dismiss, as they must.  However, 
within the federal courts, multiple and divergent interpretations as to what a 
“plausible” complaint actually looks like have emerged.  Still, if there is truth in the 
assertion that notice pleading is dead, it is only a half-death in Ohio and other states 
whose local rules of civil procedure were initially created to mirror the Federal 
Rules.  Ohio, along with twenty-five other states, adopted the interpretive “no set of 
facts” language of Conley to decide whether a pleading passes muster to survive a 
motion to dismiss.9  When Bell Atlantic disavowed that language as having “earned 
its retirement,”10 states like Ohio were faced with a decision: Must we, too, retire our 
Conley standard?  The short answer is, no.  States are free to have rules of civil 
procedure that are distinct from the Federal Rules or to interpret rules differently 
even if textually identical.  Yet, the question of whether to align with the new, but 
vague, Bell Atlantic plausibility standard for pleading is a far more complex question 
to which states must give great consideration.  Courts must take into account issues 
of forum shopping, the interplay of pleading standards and methods of regulating 
discovery, consider practitioner familiarity with the Conley threshold, and access to 
the courts to plaintiffs. 
Ohio has only briefly addressed the entrance of Bell Atlantic onto the pleading 
stage, and, thus far, Ohio state courts have mostly retained the Conley standard for 
determining pleadings.  However, multiple pleading standards are emerging, making 
the issue ripe for a determination by the Supreme Court of Ohio as to what the true 
pleading standard is for Ohio.  This Note will explain why Ohio should preserve 
Conley, even if doing so diverges from the original intent of federal-state uniformity 
embodied by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Part II outlines a brief history of 
pleading at the federal level and within Ohio, including an overview of the similarity 
of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure as compared to its Federal counterpart.  Part III 
examines the majority decision and dissent of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and the 
Supreme Court’s first reference to Bell Atlantic in Erickson v. Pardus.11  Part IV 
surveys the landscape of pleading after Bell Atlantic, with special emphasis on the 
adoption of Bell Atlantic in recent decisions in the Sixth Circuit and Ohio district 
courts—as well as the noteworthy absence of discussion of Bell Atlantic within Ohio 
state courts.  Part V discusses the importance of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which confirmed 
that Bell Atlantic represents a significant shift away from notice pleading.  Finally, 
Part VI argues that Ohio should resist the urge to adopt Bell Atlantic’s standard 
                                                          
 
7
 Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 570. 
 
8
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).  
 
9
 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45; see supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 
10
 Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 563. 
 
11
 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
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because the differences between the Ohio Rules and the Federal Rules reflect state 
policy choices, forum shopping is unlikely, and Bell Atlantic offers no clear 
advantages over Conley. 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEADING 
A.  The Path to Unified Federal Rules 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938 with the twin goals 
of establishing a set of uniform rules among all federal courts and establishing 
uniform rules between state and federal courts.12  Yet, the Federal Rules were not the 
first response to a call for uniformity among rules of court.  In 1847, the New York 
state legislature called “for a uniform course of proceeding in all cases whether of 
legal or equitable cognizance.”13  The New York Code of 1848 was born only a year 
later and created “a single form of action . . . known as the civil action,” in which 
parties were to plead facts in a simple and concise form.14  Although the new “code 
pleading” was a great step forward because it abolished the distinction between 
courts of law and courts of equity, it did not prove to be as simple as planned: 
“codifiers and the courts failed to appreciate that the difference between statements 
of fact and statements of law is almost entirely one of degree only.”15  And although 
code pleading continued to spread among the jurisdictions,16 a unified system of 
procedure was still not achieved. 
Federal procedure remained extremely complicated and required a skilled 
practitioner in order to navigate through the distinct proceedings of the federal courts 
at law and the federal courts at equity.17  Courts at equity enjoyed uniform rules due 
to a rule-making power granted by the Supreme Court by express statute.18  The 
success of this unified system of procedure, embodied in the Equity Rules of 1912, 
influenced later reform in the court of law, where little uniformity existed.19  
Congress recognized a desire for uniformity of procedures for common law claims 
through its creation of the federal courts in the Conformity Act of 1789, although it, 
too, did not subsequently result in procedural consistency.20  The Conformity Act of 
                                                          
 
12
 Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1117 (1934).  
 
13
 CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 7, at 22 (2d ed. 1947) 
(citing N.Y. LAWS 1847, c. 59, § 8) (quotations omitted). 
 
14
 Id. at 22-23.  
 
15
 Id. at 23.  
 
16
 Id. § 8, at 23.  States continued to adopt the code, and by 1947, it was in force in thirty-
two states and territories.  Id.  Other jurisdictions could be described as “quasi-code and 
common-law jurisdictions” due to a varying degrees in which they embraced the code and 
maintained common law systems.  Id.  
 
17
 Id. § 9, at 31. 
 
18
 Id. at 32-33 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 723, 730 (2006)).  
 
19
 Id. at 33. 
 
20
 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93; see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1002, at 11 (3d ed. 2002). 
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1789 required the federal procedures for common law to “be the same in each state 
respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same.”21  To 
increase federal-state intrastate uniformity, Congress passed the Conformity Act of 
1792, which “wedded federal procedure to a state’s procedure as it existed in 1789, 
creating ‘static’ uniformity” among the federal and state courts.22  In other words, 
under the 1792 Conformity Act, federal courts were supposed to align their “forms 
of writs, executions and other process” with those that had been used by state courts 
under the Conformity Act of 1789.23  However, the Conformity Act of 1792 also 
allowed federal courts to make “such alterations and additions as the said courts 
respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient,”24 which allowed 
“disuniformity to surface” as the courts evolved and used their discretion to vary 
from state procedures.25   
The American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a resolution calling for the 
establishment of federal procedural rules in 1912,26 which eventually led to Congress 
passing the Rules Enabling Act (REA) in 1934.27  The Supreme Court promulgated 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were adopted in 1938.28  Again, the 
central purpose of the rules was to promote uniformity both among federal courts 
and in court proceedings between the state and federal courts.29  Although the states 
had no legal obligation to adopt the new rules and had, in fact, been functioning 
under non-uniform standards for decades, reformers believed that the new federal 
                                                          
 
21
 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93. 
 
22
 Z.W. Julius Chen, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and 
Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (2008). 
 
23
 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.  
 
24
 Id.  
 
25
  Chen, supra note 22, at 1434. 
 
26
  Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, in 
REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 434, 
434-35 (1912). 
 
27
 See Chen, supra note 22, at 1435.  Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana was a critic of 
promulgating uniform rules at the federal level and prevented the passage of the REA until 
after his death in 1933.  Id. at 1436.  Chen describes the period of tension between the passage 
of the ABA’s resolution in 1911 and the REA’s passage in 1934: 
Establishing federal rules would clearly create federal interstate uniformity, but 
arguably at the cost of federal-state intrastate uniformity.  Echoing arguments 
supporting the early Conformity Acts, Senator Walsh, the chief critic of federally led 
uniformity, clung to the notion that the status quo prevented the evils inherent in a 
dual system, one state and one federal, and defeated the ABA’s proposals over the 
next twenty years. . . . 
With Senator Walsh’s death in 1933, the scene became ripe for the passage of the 
REA, and soon after, the Federal Rules.   
Id.  
 
28
 See Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1938-1958: Two Decades 
of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 436-38 (1958). 
 
29
 Sunderland, supra note 12.  
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rules would serve as a model for states and would be embraced by them.30  Indeed, a 
substantial majority of state civil court procedural systems adopted the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in total or have allowed the Federal Rules to strongly influence 
their state procedural systems.31  
B. Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
1. Rule 8 
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules requires that a pleading contain “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”32  In what 
has been characterized as the “keystone” of the pleading system embodied by the 
Federal Rules, Rule 8 was meant to simplify the complicated technical pleading 
requirements of earlier systems by being “construed liberally so as to do substantial 
justice.”33  Gone were the days of the common law practice in which successive 
rounds of pleading were entertained in an attempt to reduce the dispute to a single 
issue of law or fact.34  Also replaced were the subsequent code pleading 
requirements, which demanded the pleading of facts but not evidence, and which 
placed an emphasis on distinguishing among “evidentiary facts,” “ultimate facts,” 
and “conclusions.”35  Pleadings were no longer the insurmountable hurdle that a 
plaintiff had to overcome in order to bring an action to court.  Instead, Rule 8 
established “notice pleading,” the purpose of which was to put defendants on notice 
of the claims that were being asserted against them.36  Discovery and pretrial 
motions became the new forum in which issues were to be managed and potentially 
eliminated before trial.37 
                                                          
 
30
 See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. 
 
31
 John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State 
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1369, 1377 (1986).  
 
32
 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 
33
 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1202, at 87 (3d ed. 2004).  
 
34
 Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 896 (2008).  
 
35
 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, § 1216, at 207; see also Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 574 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“‘it is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among “ultimate 
facts,” “evidence,” and “conclusions.”. . . The pleading spectrum, passing from evidence 
through ultimate facts to conclusions, is largely a continuum varying only in the degree of 
particularity with which the occurrences are described.’”) (citing Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel 
H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 
518, 520-21 (1957)).  
 
36
 5 WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, supra note 33, § 1216, at 234. 
 
37
 See Ward, supra note 34, at 898. 
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2. Conley v. Gibson 
Although it was not the first Supreme Court case to address the new pleading 
standard,38 the key case that defined the pleading standard at the federal level for half 
a century was Conley v. Gibson.39  In Conley, the Supreme Court, speaking through 
Justice Black, established that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”40  This famous “no 
set of facts” language was quoted, cited, and applied as the threshold for a motion to 
dismiss thousands of times before the Supreme Court deemed that such language had 
“earned its retirement” in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.41  
 The facts of Conley presented a straightforward situation that became the 
touchstone for analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint.  In Conley, African-
American members of a Railway Union brought a class suit against the Union after 
the railroad where the plaintiffs worked purportedly abolished forty-five jobs held by 
the plaintiffs and other African-Americans.42  The complaint alleged that the jobs 
were not in fact abolished, but were instead filled by whites.43  Despite a contract 
between the Union and the Railroad that gave the employees in the bargaining unit 
protection against discharge or loss of seniority, the complaint alleged that the Union 
refused to represent the African-American employees against the discriminatory 
discharges.44  The complaint charged that such discrimination violated the plaintiffs’ 
rights to fair representation under the Railway Labor Act, and the complaint 
requested relief in the form of a declaratory judgment, injunction, and damages.45  
The Union moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including through a 
                                                          
 
38
 The Supreme Court first addressed the pleading standard for Rule 8(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (1944).  The Court examined 
the sufficiency of a “home drawn” pro se complaint in which the plaintiff alleged that some of 
the “tonics” he had imported from Italy were unlawfully stolen and others sold at auction by 
the Collector of Customs.  Id. at 774.  The plaintiff’s first complaint was dismissed by the 
District Court for failure to “state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” with leave to 
amend.  Id.  When the plaintiff returned with a second complaint that demonstrated a 
“heightened conviction that he was being unjustly treated,” the district court dismissed again 
on the same grounds without leave to amend.  Id. at 775.  Although acknowledging that the 
plaintiff “comes to us with increased volubility, if not clarity,” the Court held that the plaintiff 
had stated enough to withstand a motion to dismiss.  Id. at 775.  The Court explained that 
under the new rules of civil procedure, only a “short and plain statement of the claim” was 
necessary, not the pleading of “facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”  Id.  The Court 
held that “however inartistically they may be stated, the plaintiff has disclosed his claims” and 
refused to deprive the plaintiff of his day in court.  Id.   
 
39
 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 
40
 Id. at 45-46.  
 
41
 Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 563. 
 
42
 Conley, 355 U.S. at 43.  Shepardizing of the “no set of facts” language revealed that it 
had been cited more than 20,000 times as of February 21, 2010.  
 
43
 Id.  
 
44
 Id.  
 
45
 Id.  
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12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.”46  
Although the Court reversed the action on other grounds, the Court took the 
opportunity to address the arguments as to the sufficiency of the complaint.47  The 
Conley Court declared that “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a 
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”48  Instead, all 
that is necessary for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is “‘a short and plain 
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”49  Echoing the liberal pleading 
standard embodied by the Rules, the Court noted that “[t]he Federal Rules reject the 
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be 
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to 
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”50  
The Conley standard embodied the liberal philosophy underpinning the Federal 
Rules by reiterating that only in the rarest of circumstances—“unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim”—
would the pleading stage be the proper place to dispose of a case.51  To those who 
still clung to the more complicated pleadings of the past, “The immediate effect of 
Conley was to put an end to the murmurs of opposition to the new pleading standard 
of the Federal Rules and to clarify that yes, the new liberal rules mean what they 
say.”52  Indeed, one scholar distilled the Conley pleading doctrine down to four key 
aspects.53  First, the statements of the complaint were explicitly to put the defendant 
on notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the basis for that claim.54  Second, no factual 
detail was necessary at the pleading stage to flesh out the claim.55  Third, only if 
absolutely no claim existed—meaning that a plaintiff could prove no facts to support 
liability—would dismissal be warranted.56  Finally, the pleading stage was not the 
                                                          
 
46
 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 
47
 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45.  It is interesting to note that Conley’s famous “no set of facts” 
language is arguably dicta.  The Court actually reversed the case by holding that it was error 
for the lower courts to have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  Id. at 44.  There 
was no need for the Court to have reached the motion to dismiss issue, but the Court went on 
to consider the issue anyway: “Although the District Court did not pass on the other reasons 
advanced for dismissal of the complaint we think it timely and proper for us to consider them 
here.”  Id. at 45.  
 
48
 Id. at 47. 
 
49
 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 
50
 Id. at 48. 
 
51
 Id. at 45-46. 
 
52
 Spencer, supra note 1, at 435-36. 
 
53
 Id. at 438-39. 
 
54
 Id. at 438.  
 
55
 Id.  
 
56
 Id. at 438-39.  
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proper forum for screening out claims on the merits.57  These liberal core 
components of pleading supported the ideals of open access to justice by permitting 
plaintiffs to have their day in court.  The pre-trial functions of discovery and 
summary judgment became the vehicles for analyzing the merits of a claim.  This 
ensured that considerably more time and energy would be devoted to the substance 
of a claim than would be given at the pleading stage.  
C. Ohio’s Rules of Civil Procedure 
1. The Ohio Civil Rules 
With the adoption of the Ohio Civil Rules in 1970,58 Ohio’s Rules became one of 
twenty-three state rules that were “replicas” of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.59  By adopting state rules that mirrored the Federal Rules, Ohio created 
“‘but one procedure for state and federal courts.’”60  Previously, Ohio was a code 
pleading jurisdiction, having followed the lead of New York by adopting the New 
York Code in 1853.61  In a 1986 comprehensive survey of state court rules of civil 
procedure, procedural experts Professor Oakley and Professor Coon sought to 
identify the level of uniformity among state court rules of civil procedure with the 
Federal Rules.62  Because of the importance that the Federal Rules placed on 
pleadings being liberally construed, the Professors placed special emphasis on 
examining the state civil rules governing pleadings and motions directed at 
pleadings. 63  Thus, one of their criteria for classification of a state as a “Federal 
Rules Replica” 64 included that the pleading rules “as written and interpreted provide 
without qualification for the liberal conception of ‘notice pleading’ practiced in 
federal courts under the aegis of Conley v. Gibson.” 65  Ohio’s conformity to the 
                                                          
 
57
 Id. at 439. 
 
58
 1 JAMES M. KLEIN & STANTON G. DARLING II, BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE: CIVIL 
PRACTICE ix (2d ed. 2004) (containing annotated civil rules 1-16).  The Ohio Civil Rules went 
into effect July 1, 1970.   
 
59
 Oakley & Coon, supra note 31, at 1413.  A state’s rules of civil procedure were 
considered a “replica” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the two were essentially 
identical in certain key aspects.  Id.; see supra note 64. 
 
60
 Id. at 1372 (citing W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9, 
at 45 (Wright ed. 1960)). 
 
61
 CLARK, supra note 13, § 8, at 24. 
 
62
 Oakley & Coon, supra note 31, at 1368.  
 
63
 Id. at 1373; see also CLARK, supra note 13, § 11, at 54.  A major difference between the 
old ways of Code Pleading and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was how each procedure 
approached pleadings.  Id.  Under the Federal Rules, emphasis was placed on giving “fair 
notice of the pleader’s case to the opposing party and to the court.”  Id.  Under Code Pleading, 
emphasis was placed on outlining the issue to be tried with the material facts of the case.  Id.  
 
64
 Oakley & Coon, supra note 31, at 1374.  This was one criterion of nine used to 
distinguish state court rules of procedure from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
determine the degree of symmetry between the two. 
 
65
 Id.   
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Federal Rules, including its adoption of the Conley standard, created a federal-state 
uniformity of practice and earned Ohio the status of a Federal Rules Replica.66 
Like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ohio Rule 8(a) requires only that a 
pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is 
entitled to relief.”67  Likewise, Ohio Rule 12(B)(6) permits dismissal of a claim for 
the “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”68  After the adoption 
of these rules, Ohio cases embraced the liberal pleading standard embodied by the 
Federal Rules right from the start.69  In 1974, an Ohio Court of Appeals, citing 
Conley and numerous federal court of appeals cases, noted that “few complaints fail 
to meet the liberal standards of Rule 8 and become subject to dismissal.”70  One year 
later, the Supreme Court of Ohio formally adopted the “no set of facts” language of 
Conley in O’Brien v. University Community Tenants Union.71  
2. O’Brien v. University Community Tenants Union 
In O’Brien, the plaintiff sued a Union alleging that the Union had created a 
“blacklist” with defamatory statements against the plaintiff and other landlords for 
the purpose of deterring tenants from leasing from those landlords.72  In examining 
the sufficiency of the complaint, the court adopted Conley and held that a complaint 
should survive a motion to dismiss “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim.’”73  The court acknowledged that 
the plaintiff’s claim might indeed be difficult to prove in later stages of litigation.74  
Yet, because the court reasoned that “there can be a set of facts which would entitle 
appellee to relief,” the court held that the complaint was adequate to survive a 
motion to dismiss: “Since it does not appear beyond doubt that appellee can prove no 
set of facts which would entitle him to relief, the judgment . . . must be affirmed.”75   
O’Brien has been continually cited for its adoption of Conley’s “no set of facts” 
as the pleading standard in Ohio.76  Additionally, as discussed by Justice Stevens’ 
                                                          
 
66
 See id.  
 
67
 OHIO R. CIV. P. 8(A)(1). 
 
68
 OHIO R. CIV. P. 12(B)(6).  
 
69
 See Slife v. Kundtz Props., Inc., 318 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974). 
 
70
 Id. (italics omitted). 
 
71
 O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 1975). 
 
72
 Id. at 753.  
 
73
 Id. at 755 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45). 
 
74
 Id. at 755. 
 
75
 Id. at 755-56.  
 
76
 Shepardizing revealed that, as of February 22, 2010, O’Brien has been cited more than 
1,350 times for its recitation of the “no set of facts” standard for a motion to dismiss.  
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Ohio has cited O’Brien approvingly over fifty times.  See, 
e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 849 N.E.2d 268, 272 (Ohio 2006) (“In order for a 
court to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 
in support of his or her claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”); Taylor v. City of 
London, 723 N.E.2d 1089, 1091 (Ohio 2000) (“‘In order for a court to dismiss a complaint for 
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dissent in Bell Atlantic, twenty-five other states adopted Conley as the state standard 
for evaluating a pleading’s ability to survive a motion to dismiss.77  
III. ENTER BELL ATLANTIC V. TWOMBLY 
One of the difficulties in trying to understand the reach and impact of Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly is that it was a fairly complex antitrust case dealing 
specifically with the telecommunications industry; yet, the language used by the 
Supreme Court in its holding extended far beyond the antitrust realm.78  Bell Atlantic 
was a class-action antitrust case brought in the Southern District of New York by 
                                                          
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Civ.R.12(B)(6)), it must appear 
beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to 
recovery.’”); Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 668 N.E.2d 889, 891 
(Ohio 1996) (“In a civil case before a court, ‘it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery’ before a motion to dismiss 
can be granted.”) (citing O’Brien, 327 N.E.2d at 753). 
 
77
 Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  These states—in addition to Ohio—
include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming.  Id. at n.5.  Additionally, at least eight other states adopted standards 
substantially similar to that posed in Conley: Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Missouri, Utah, and Virginia.  Id.  
The Ohio case cited by Justice Stevens in his dissent is State ex rel. Turner v. Houk, 862 
N.E.2d 104 (Ohio 2007) (per curiam).  Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 578 n.5.  In Turner, the Court 
granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss because “it appears beyond doubt that [the 
plaintiff] could prove no set of facts warranting the requested extraordinary relief in 
mandamus.”  862 N.E.2d at 105.  Turner was a curious choice to cite as an example of Ohio’s 
use of Conley in that Turner does not cite O’Brien for the “no set of facts” standard.  Id.  
(citing State ex rel. Rashada v. Pianka, 857 N.E.2d 1220, p.*2 instead).  The case was also a 
per curiam decision.  See id.  It is likely that Justice Stevens cited Turner to show the 
contemporary nature of the Conley “no set of facts” pleading standard in Ohio because Turner 
had been decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio only two months before Bell Atlantic.  
 
78
 Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 544.  A brief explanation of the telecommunications industry is 
helpful in understanding the situation presented in Bell Atlantic.  The telecommunications 
industry underwent a major transformation in 1984 when the American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company (AT&T) was divested into a system of regional telephone service 
monopolies, formally called “Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers” (ILECs) and commonly 
known as “Baby Bells.” Id. at 548.  While the AT&T monopoly was eliminated by this 1984 
action in regard to long distance services, the ILECs continued to maintain a local telephone 
service monopoly.  Id. at 548.   
In response to these monopolies, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in 
order to restructure the market and “facilitate market entry” by other competitors.  Id.; see also 
Ward, supra note 34, at 902 (giving a concise history of the AT&T monopoly breakup). 
Under this Act, the ILECs had an obligation to share their networks with competitors called 
“Competitive Local Exchange Carriers” (CLECs).  Bell Atl., 550 U.S. 549.  However, after 
this 1996 Act and several subsequent revisions to its terms by the Federal Communications 
Commission, the ILECs allowed some CLECs into their territories, but the ILECs did not 
actively compete with CLECs in each other’s territories.  Id.   
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local telephone and Internet subscribers against several major ILECs.79  The 
plaintiffs sought damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief claiming 
violations of Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits agreeing to 
engage in conduct unfavorable to competition.80  Essentially, the plaintiffs claimed 
that the Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) had “engaged in parallel 
conduct” in their respective areas of service in order to inhibit the growth of 
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs).81  Plaintiffs also claimed that the 
defendant ILECs had entered into an illegal conspiracy to refrain from competing 
against each other.82  
The federal district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that 
the allegations of parallel conduct, absent additional information, were not alone 
sufficient to state a claim under Section One of the Sherman Act for which relief 
could be granted.83  The Second Circuit reversed, holding that such additional “plus 
factors” were not required at the pleading stage, and that the allegations of parallel 
conduct were adequate to support the claim unless “no set of facts . . . would permit 
a plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product of 
collusion rather than coincidence.”84  The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to 
address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations 
of parallel conduct” more generally.85  The Court reversed the Second Circuit in a 7-
2 decision written by Justice Souter and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.86  Despite this narrow question presented 
on certiorari, the Court addressed much more than the pleading standard for antitrust 
cases: it abrogated the crucial “no set of facts” language of Conley that applied to all 
pleading standards, which the Court had endorsed for the previous half-century.  
A. The Majority Decision 
The main question that the Supreme Court set out in Bell Atlantic was “what a 
plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”87  
Specifically, the question presented was “whether a § 1 complaint can survive a 
motion to dismiss when it alleges that major telecommunications providers engaged 
in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context 
suggesting agreement, as distinct from identical, independent action.”88  The Court 
held that “an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will 
                                                          
 
79
 Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 550. 
 
80
 Id.  
 
81
 Id. 
 
82
 Id.  
 
83
 Id. at 552.  
 
84
 Id. at 553 (citing the lower court’s decision, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 
99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)).  
 
85
 Id.  
 
86
 Id.  
 
87
 Id. at 554-55 (emphasis omitted).  
 
88
 Id. at 548-49.  
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not suffice” and that the complaint for such a claim “requires . . . enough factual 
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”89  
But instead of stopping after articulating this requirement of pleading “plausible 
grounds to infer an agreement” within the antitrust conspiracy context, the Court 
went on to examine the “no set of facts” language presented in Conley—language 
that is not limited merely to pleading in antitrust cases but affects pleading standards 
as a whole.90  The Court explained that reading Conley’s “no set of facts” language 
in isolation would result in all pleading statements being rendered sufficient unless 
they were factually impossible to prove.91  The Court “retired” the language of 
Conley, declaring that “after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous 
observation has earned its retirement.”92  In its place, the Court articulated a new 
standard: A complaint requires the pleading of “enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”93  The Court explicitly rejected that this new standard 
required any “heightened fact pleading of specifics.”94  Instead, plaintiffs—
presumably those presenting antitrust issues or otherwise—would now have to 
“nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” lest their 
complaint be dismissed.95  
B. Justice Stevens’ Dissent 
Finding that the majority opinion reflected a “dramatic departure from settled 
procedural law,”96  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsberg, authored a lengthy 
dissent, noting that “[i]f Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language is to be interred, let it not 
                                                          
 
89
 Id. at 556.  
 
90
 Id. at 556. 
 
91
 Id. at 561.   
 
92
 Id. at 563.  The Court went on to explain that “[t]he phrase is best forgotten as an 
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated 
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in 
the complaint.”  Id.  
 
93
 Id. at 570.  
 
94
 Id. (“In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading standard, 
nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can only be 
accomplished ‘“by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial 
interpretation.”’” (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) and quoting 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 
(1993))).  The Court specifically claimed that its decision was not contrary to Swierkiewicz, in 
which the Court held that the pleading of specific facts was not necessary to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  Id.  According to the Court, Swierkiewicz was distinguishable 
because, in that case, the Court of Appeals had “impermissibly applied what amounted to a 
heightened pleading requirement by insisting that Swierkiewicz allege ‘specific facts’ beyond 
those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.”  Id.  “Here, 
in contrast, we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Id.  The Court did not, however, define 
what constitutes “plausible.”  Id.  
 
95
 Id.  
 
96
 Id. at 573. 
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be without a eulogy.”97  Among other practical concerns with the holding,98 Justice 
Stevens specifically noted the effect that the Court’s unanticipated departure from 
Conley could have on the many states that had adopted the Conley standard within 
their own interpretations of rules of procedure: “I would not rewrite the Nation’s 
civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the pleading rules of most of its States 
without far more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so.”99  The dissent 
proposed that such a change to the pleading standard should only be made via the 
rulemaking process for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that it was wholly 
unnecessary for the Court to have reached a discussion of Conley at all.100 
C. The First Reference to Bell Atlantic: Erickson v. Pardus 
Only fourteen days after deciding Bell Atlantic, the Court added another twist to 
the pleading landscape when it released the per curium decision Erickson v. 
Pardus.101  In Erickson, a pro se prisoner plaintiff alleged that he had a liver 
condition resulting from hepatitis C and that prison officials had wrongfully 
terminated his treatment for the condition.102  The prisoner had commenced the year-
long treatment, which required weekly self-injections of medication through the use 
of a syringe.  However, he was removed from the treatment when prison officials 
suspected that the prisoner had been using or allowing others to use the syringe for 
illegal drugs.103  According to prison protocol, a prisoner using illicit drugs during 
the treatment is banned from the treatment for one year.104  Facing a lengthy 
                                                          
 
97
 Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 
98
 The dissenters would come to the opposite conclusion as to the actual antitrust question 
presented as well:  
If the defendants acted independently, their conduct was perfectly lawful.  If, 
however, that conduct is the product of horizontal agreement among potential 
competitors, it was unlawful.  Plaintiffs have alleged such agreement and, because the 
complaint was dismissed in advance of answer, the allegation has not even been 
denied.  Why then does the case not proceed?  Does a judicial opinion that the charge 
is not “plausible” provide a legally acceptable reason for dismissing the complaint?  I 
think not. 
Id. at 573.  The dissent identified “[t]wo practical concerns” that “presumably explain” the 
Court’s decision.  Id..  First, antitrust litigation can be extremely expensive.  Id.  Second, 
evidence of parallel conduct can confuse jurors into believing that such evidence is proof that 
the parties acted under an unlawful agreement, when in fact they simply acted in a similar 
manner independently.  Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  While the dissent argues these concerns 
“merit careful case management . . . they do not . . . justify the dismissal of an adequately 
pleaded complaint without even requiring the defendant to file answers denying [the] charge.”  
Id. 
 
99
 Id. at 579. 
 
100
 Id. 
 
101
 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).  Bell Atlantic was decided on May 21, 2007, 
and Erickson was decided only a few days later on June 4, 2007.   
 
102
 Id. at 89.   
 
103
 Id. at 90-91.  
 
104
 Id.  
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eighteen-month delay in his treatment, the prisoner denied that he took the syringe 
for any illicit purpose and filed a complaint against the doctor alleging that removing 
him from his hepatitis C treatment would put his life in danger in violation of his 
Eighth Amendment rights.105   
The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to allege that the doctor had 
caused the prisoner “substantial harm.”106  The court of appeals affirmed, holding 
that the prisoner had made “only conclusory allegations” that he suffered harm as a 
result of removal from the treatment.107  The Supreme Court vacated and remanded 
the decision, holding that it was error for the court of appeals to conclude that the 
allegations were “too conclusory” to demonstrate, at the pleading stage, that the 
prisoner had not suffered a cognizable harm as a result of the suspension from his 
course of treatment.108 
In an attempt to demonstrate what of Conley had survived Bell Atlantic, the 
Court cited  language in Bell Atlantic that was quoted from Conley, that a statement 
in a complaint “need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests.’”109  The Court explicitly stated that “[s]pecific facts 
are not necessary” in order to satisfy Federal Rule 8(a), perhaps endeavoring to 
reinforce that notice pleading survived Bell Atlantic.110  However, this proposition is 
undercut by the fact that the prisoner in Erickson was a pro se litigant, and as the 
Court acknowledged, “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held 
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”111  Pro se 
pleadings have always been held to a less stringent standard than have pleadings by 
those with counsel.112  It is difficult to construe from Erickson how the Court 
intended Bell Atlantic to be applied to non-pro se pleadings in light of this fact.113 
Erickson is viewed by some as an attempt by the Court to mitigate the 
significance of Bell Atlantic.114  The fact that the case was issued so quickly after 
Bell Atlantic suggests that the Court may have anticipated the confusion surrounding 
the pleading standard that would result from Bell Atlantic and wished to strategically 
                                                          
 
105
 Id.   
 
106
 Id. at 92 (quotations omitted) (citing Recommendation on Defendants’ Motion To 
Dismiss p. 12 in Civ. Action No. 05-CV-00405-LTB-MJW). 
 
107
 Id. (quotations omitted) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 198 F. App’x 694, 698 (10th Cir. 
2006)). 
 
108
 Id. at 93.  
 
109
 Id. (quoting Bell Atl.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  
 
110
 Id.  
 
111
 Id. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
 
112
 See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 
 
113
 Hon. Colleen McMahon, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 861 (2008) (suggesting that 
“Erickson simply means that Twombly’s ‘plausibility’ standard, like all pleading standards, is 
to be applied less stringently to pro se plaintiffs.”)  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
114
 See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term: Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 310-11 
n.51 (2007).  
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reinforce that notice pleading under Conley had not been eliminated.115  Not all have 
been convinced.116  In addition to the fact that the plaintiff appeared pro se, the 
prisoner’s claim presented a fairly straightforward case: the prisoner pleaded that the 
termination of his hepatitis C treatment endangered his life, which is a claim under 
the Eight Amendment.117  Such a claim is also plausible because he did in fact suffer 
from hepatitis C, which is commonly understood to have fatal consequences if left 
untreated.118  Put simply, Erickson was too easy of a case to attempt to flesh out the 
relationship between Conley and the new plausibility standard post Bell Atlantic.119   
IV. THE LANDSCAPE AFTER BELL ATLANTIC: “NOTICE-PLUS”120 PLEADING 
A. The Second Circuit Attempts to Apply “Plausiblity”: Iqbal v. Hasty 
The Second Circuit was the first court to discuss the impact of Bell Atlantic on 
pleading in Iqbal v. Hasty.121  In Iqbal, the court began its analysis by 
acknowledging that “[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard for 
assessing the adequacy of pleadings has recently been created by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic.”122  The Iqbal court identified four signals which 
“point toward a new and heightened pleading standard”: (1) the Court’s disavowal of 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language; (2) the Court’s use of numerous phrases to 
indicate that more than mere notice of  a claim is needed to satisfy a Section One 
antitrust violation; (3) the Court’s disregard that “careful case management” alone 
could sufficiently dispose of a groundless case early in the discovery process; and (4) 
the Court’s use of the word “plausibility” fifteen times to suggest a new standard.123  
                                                          
 
115
 Id.  
 
116
 See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 1, at 139.  Dodson “doubt[s Erickson] will temper the 
import of Bell Atlantic.”  Id. at 140; see also Spencer, supra note 1, at 456.  Although Spencer 
says “[t]he Erickson Court’s nod to notice pleading . . . do[es] soften the edges of Twombly, 
seeming to assure readers that not all of Conley’s legacy has been discarded,” Spencer goes on 
to explain that the nature of Erickson makes it “not a proper case in which to test how the 
Court will apply Twombly in subsequent cases.”  Id. at 456-57. 
 
117
 Erickson, 551 U.S. at 90.  (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain .  . . proscribed by the 
Eighth Amendment.” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976))). 
 
118
 Id. at 92. 
 
119
 See Spencer, supra note 1, at 456 (“Erickson’s brief homage to notice pleading and the 
liberal ethos ring hollow in the context of this clear-cut case . . . .”). 
 
120
 Dodson, supra note 1, at 138. 
 
121
 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).  After hearing oral arguments for Iqbal in 
early October, the Second Circuit required the parties to submit supplemental briefs 
addressing “whether this Court should await the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly v. Bell 
Atlantic [sic] . . . before deciding this appeal.”  Supplemental Brief for Appellants John 
Ashcroft & Robert Mueller at 1, Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-
5768-cv, 05-5844-cv, 05-6379-cv, 05-6352-cv, 05-6378-cv, 05-6368-cv, 05-6358-cv, 05-
6388-cv).  Twombly v. Bell Atlantic had been decided by the Second Circuit, which may 
explain why the court was eager to know the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bell Atlantic. 
 
122
 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155.  
 
123
 Id. at 155-56.  
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The court then considered five aspects of Bell Atlantic which “point away from a 
heightened pleading standard and suggest” a narrow reading of the case as applicable 
only to Section One allegations: (1) the Court’s specific disclaimer that it was 
imposing a heightened pleading of specific facts; (2) the Court’s explicit approval of 
the general allegation of negligence exemplified in Form 9 of the Federal Civil 
Rules;124 (3) the Court’s concern with the “sprawling” costs of discovery in antitrust 
conspiracy cases and fear that defendants will be pressed to settle “even anemic 
cases” that survive the motion to dismiss stage; (4) the Court’s failure to disclaim its 
prior statement that “federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and 
control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later”; and, 
(5) the fact that the Court cited Bell Atlantic as standing for the traditional pleading 
requirement that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary” under Rule 8 only two weeks 
later in Erickson.125  
After balancing these competing signals, the Second Circuit concluded that Bell 
Atlantic was not limited to the context of antitrust cases due to its sweeping rejection 
of Conley’s “no set of facts” language, which had been a key aspect of notice 
pleading.126  Instead, the Second Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court had 
changed the pleading standard to a “flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a 
pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where 
such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”127  This early 
interpretation of Bell Atlantic predicted that the Court had in fact intended to alter 
the pleading standard generally, despite discussion among scholars that Bell Atlantic 
was limited to the realm of antitrust cases.128  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to the Second Circuit and, as discussed in Part VI, confirmed that the change to 
pleading was permanent and pervasive, but not quite as “flexible” as the Second 
Circuit had hoped.129 
                                                          
 
124
 Id. at 156.  Form 9 (currently Form 11) exemplifies a “Complaint for Negligence,” 
giving the hypothetical allegation that a defendant “negligently drove a motor vehicle against 
plaintiff who was then crossing [an identified] highway.”  Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. APP. 
FORM 9).  Although this exemplary allegation does not include specific allegations as to how 
the driver was negligent, the Bell Atlantic Court approved this type of general allegation as 
adequate, while finding that the plaintiffs in Bell Atlantic had fallen short by alleging “merely 
legal conclusions” of conspiracy.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).  
 
125
 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 156-57. 
 
126
 Id. at 157. 
 
127
 Id. at 157-58. 
 
128
 See Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007) (“The Court used ‘plausibility’ in 
its antitrust context, to resolve an existing problem in antitrust law, and it is a misreading of 
Twombly to extend ‘plausibility’ beyond that context.”).  The Supreme Court expressly 
rejected this interpretation in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937, 1953 (2009) (“Our decision in 
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and 
discrimination suits alike.” (citation omitted)). 
 
129
 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see infra Part VI.  
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B. Divergent Views of Plausibility Emerge 
After the Second Circuit’s decision, other circuits followed suit, attempting to 
address the meaning of Bell Atlantic in their review of motions to dismiss.130  
Several vague interpretations and applications have emerged, ranging from findings 
that Bell Atlantic significantly changed the pleading standards of Rule 8,131 to not at 
all,132 to only “in some cases.”133  For example, after a lengthy analysis of Bell 
Atlantic in Phillips v. County of Allegheny, the Third Circuit concluded that the 
Supreme Court intended Bell Atlantic to stand for the proposition that Rule 8 
“requires not merely a short and plain statement, but instead mandates a statement 
‘showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”134  Instead of finding a standard 
similar to the Second Circuit’s “flexible plausibility standard,” the Third Circuit 
interpreted Bell Atlantic to require “some showing sufficient to justify moving the 
case beyond the pleadings to the next stage of litigation.”135  Thus, at least one 
circuit court views Bell Atlantic as having specifically added requirements beyond 
the text of Rule 8.136  
Other courts have focused on the aspects of Conley that Bell Atlantic retained.137  
In Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Memorial Institute, the Fourth Circuit did 
not cite the “plausibility” language of Bell Atlantic and cited only the portions of 
Bell Atlantic that referenced Conley favorably.138  This suggests that the Fourth 
Circuit did not view Bell Atlantic as having significantly altered the pleading 
standard at all.  Likewise, in McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., the Federal Circuit 
expressly stated that Bell Atlantic did not change the pleading standard under the 
                                                          
 
130
 See generally Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2008); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 
143 (2d Cir. 2007); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008); Barclay 
White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem’l Inst., 262 F. App’x 556 (4th Cir. 2008); Burnette v. 
Bureau of Prisons, 277 F. App’x 329 (5th Cir. 2007); Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v. 
Symmes Twp., 512 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2008); Jervis v. Mitcheff, 258 F. App’x 3 (7th Cir. 
2007); Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261 F. App’x 926 (8th Cir. 2008); Grabinski v. Nat’l Union 
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 265 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2008); Burris v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
262 F. App’x 103 (10th Cir. 2008); Davis v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955 (11th Cir. 
2008); Powers v. Wickline, 252 F. App’x 324 (D.C. Cir. 2007); McZeal v. Sprint Nextel 
Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 
131
 See, e.g., Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157-58; Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234; Davis, 516 F.3d at 974 
n.43. 
 
132
 See Barclay, 262 F. App’x at 560; McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1357 n.4.   
 
133
 See Midwest Media Prop., 512 F.3d at 341 n.1.  
 
134
 Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234. 
 
135
 Id. at 234-35. 
 
136
 See id.   
 
137
 See Grabinski, 265 F. App’x at 635; Barclay, 262 F. App’x at 560.  
 
138
 Barclay, 262 F. App’x at 560 (“Rule 8 ‘requires only “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice 
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”’” (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))).  
Id.  
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Federal Rule.139  After briefly analyzing Bell Atlantic, the Federal Circuit concluded 
“[t]his does not suggest that Bell Atlantic changed the pleading requirement of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 as articulated in Conley.”140 
On the other hand, in Midwest Media Property v. Symmes Township, the Sixth 
Circuit interpreted the case as standing for the proposition that “in some cases, a 
plaintiff must plead particular facts in their complaint.”141  While acknowledging 
that Bell Atlantic had not defined what these “some cases” included, it read Bell 
Atlantic to require the pleading of “specific facts” in cases likely to produce 
expansive and expensive litigation.142  Still other circuit courts have cited language 
from Bell Atlantic acknowledging that it represents a new pleading standard for 
evaluating a motion to dismiss, but without providing analysis as to what, if any, 
change it embodies.143   
V. THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMS BELL ATLANTIC IN ASHCROFT V. IQBAL 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Second Circuit in the Iqbal case in 
November 2008, which was viewed by many as an indication that the Court would 
shed light on its true intent in Bell Atlantic.144  The Court confirmed that it had in fact 
altered the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss.145  Yet, the Court’s 
explanation as to how “plausibility” pleading should be applied in federal court does 
not present a desirable standard and does not change the fact that Ohio should retain 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language for evaluating a motion to dismiss.146 
A. Ashcroft v. Iqbal  
The facts of Iqbal demonstrate the burden plaintiffs must now overcome due to 
the Court embracing heightening pleading and disregarding notice pleading.  After 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was arrested on 
                                                          
 
139
 McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1357 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 
140
 Id.  The Federal Circuit continued: “In fact, as illustrated above, Bell Atlantic favorably 
quoted Conley.”  Id.  While Bell Atlantic did quote aspects of Conley favorably, it is difficult 
to interpret the Court’s rejection of Conley’s key “no set of facts” language as not altering the 
pleading standard under Rule 8 at all. 
 
141
 Midwest Media Prop., L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., 512 F.3d 338, 341 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 
142
 Id.   
 
143
 See, e.g., Burnette v. Bureau of Prisons, 277 F. App’x 329, 331 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(“Burnette’s pleadings contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face’ with respect to some of the BOP officials named in his lawsuit.” (quoting Bell Atl., 550 
U.S. at 570)); Burris v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 262 F. App’x 103, 106 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that the complaint’s allegations “failed to meet [the] basic requirements” of being raised above 
the “‘speculative level’” (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555)); Davis v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 516 F.3d 955, 974 n.43 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The main Rule 8(a) standard now seems to be 
whether the ‘allegations plausibly suggest[] ([and are] not merely consistent with)’ a violation 
of the law.” (alterations in original) (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 557)). 
 
144
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008). 
 
145
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“[O]nly a complaint that states a 
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”). 
 
146
 See infra Part VI.   
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criminal charges and detained by federal officials.147  Iqbal filed a Bivens action148 
against federal officials, claiming that the officials subjected him to harsh conditions 
and confinement based upon his race, religion, or national origin.149  The twenty-one 
count complaint set forth allegations detailing harsh treatment by his jailors as well 
as contentions that former Attorney General John D. Ashcroft was the architect of a 
policy of unconstitutionally “holding post-September 11th detainees in highly 
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI.”150  The 
allegations against Ashcroft were the only allegations considered before the Court in 
Iqbal.151   
Both the trial court and the Second Circuit denied Ashcroft’s motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim.152  The trial court based its decision upon the then-intact 
Conley standard.153  As discussed in Part IV.A, the Second Circuit attempting to 
apply the newly announced plausibility standard, denied the motion to dismiss by 
holding that the context of the case did not require Iqbal to amplify his claim with 
factual allegations in order to render the claim “plausible.”154  
The Supreme Court reversed and granted the motion to dismiss.155  In examining 
the requirements for a Bivens action, the Court explained that one must “plead and 
prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose.”156  The Court 
interpreted this element to require—at the pleading stage—that the plaintiff “plead 
sufficient factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and implemented the 
detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose 
of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.”157  Focusing on the 
government’s strong defense of qualified immunity, the Court explained that 
                                                          
 
147
 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942. 
 
148
 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 
(1971). 
 
149
 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942. 
 
150
 Id. at 1944. 
 
151
 Id.  Specifically, the Court later clarified:  
[W]e express no opinion concerning the sufficiency of respondent’s complaint against 
eh defendants who are not before us.  Respondant’s account of his prison ordeal 
alleges serious official misconduct that we do not address here.  Our decision is 
limited to the determination that respondent’s complaint does not entitle him to relief 
from [Aschcroft, et. al]. 
Id. at 1952. 
 
152
 Id. at 1944. 
 
153
 Id. 
 
154
 Id.; see supra Part IV.  
 
155
 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.  The Court left the decision to the Second Circuit whether to 
allow Iqbal to “seek leave to amend his deficient complaint.”  Id.   
 
156
 Id. at 1948.  
 
157
 Id. at 1948-49.  (emphasis added).  
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“purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the 
subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination . . . .”158 
The immediate problem with this interpretation is that, although a plaintiff’s 
Bivens claim will ultimately hinge on whether discovery reveals evidence of a 
discriminatory purpose, such evidence is in the possession of the defendant at the 
time of filing a complaint.  Without addressing this important issue, the Court 
nevertheless analyzed whether the complaint sufficiently demonstrated a 
discriminatory purpose through the lens of Bell Atlantic.  
The Court re-examined Bell Atlantic and explained that it calls for a “two-
pronged approach” for analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint.159  First, a court 
must accept as true all of the allegations in a complaint, but not legal conclusions.160  
Second, all complaints must state plausible claims for relief in order to survive a 
motion to dismiss.161  
In applying this two-pronged approach to the facts of Iqbal, the Court held that 
the complaint’s assertions failed the first prong because they were “bare” and 
“conclusory.”162  In a statement that harkens the days of code pleading, the Court 
reasoned, “It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations rather than their 
extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”163   
In what amounts to a blending of the summary judgment standard with a motion 
to dismiss, the Court held that the complaint failed the second “plausibility” prong 
because the allegations were not “plausible” when considered in light of the Court’s 
own reasoning, not in light of any evidence.164  Iqbal pled that the petitioners crafted 
a policy of detaining individuals “of high interest” in extremely restrictive conditions 
because of their race, religion, or national origin.165  The Court admitted that Iqbal’s 
allegation, taken as true, is consistent with a plan of purposefully designating 
detainees “of high interest” because of their race, religion, or national origin.  But the 
Court went on to conclude on its own—at the pleading stage without the benefit of 
discovery, argument, or briefing—that “given more likely explanations, they do not 
plausibly establish this purpose.”166 
The Court continued its reasoning that, in a post-September 11th world, it is 
unsurprising that “a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain 
                                                          
 
158
 Id. at 1949.  
 
159
 Id. at 1950. 
 
160
 Id. at 1949. 
 
161
 Id. at 1950. 
 
162
 Id. at 1951.  Iqbal pled that the petitioners “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and 
maliciously agreed to subject [him]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, 
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate 
penological interest.’” Id.  Although the Court noted that these assertions were not “unrealistic 
or nonsensical,” it held that they were legal conclusions that were not entitled to be assumed 
to be true.   
 
163
 Id.  
 
164
 Id.  
 
165
 Id.  
 
166
 Id.  
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individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, 
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to 
target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”167  By essentially conducting a review for 
summary judgment based upon its own conclusions, the Court held that the 
complaint did not plead any “factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest 
petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind.”168   
Unfortunately, such evidence is not readily accessible to the plaintiff until the 
commencement of discovery.  The Court emphasized that the purpose of the defense 
of governmental qualified immunity “is to free officials from the concerns of 
litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’”169  By expecting plaintiffs 
to be “omniscient”170 as to their defendant’s state of mind at the pleading stage, the 
Court gave significant weight to the government’s defense of qualified immunity at 
an inappropriate time in the proceedings.   
VI. OHIO DISTRICT COURTS AND THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AFTER BELL ATLANTIC AND 
IQBAL 
A. Nicsand v. 3M: A Case Similar to Bell Atlantic 
Federal courts within the Sixth Circuit have readily applied Bell Atlantic to 
motions to dismiss in the antitrust realm and to motions to dismiss generally, 
discarding the Conley “no set of facts” threshold and implementing the plausibility 
standard.  However, the implementation of Bell Atlantic can hardly be characterized 
as seamless or without objections.  In the antitrust case NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co.,171 
the Sixth Circuit noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had made clear that “a ‘naked 
assertion’ of antitrust injury . . . is not enough” and went on to hold that “NicSand 
simply has not alleged facts establishing that the agreements in and of themselves 
created market-entry barriers that caused it a cognizable antitrust injury.”172  The 
Sixth Circuit viewed the case to be analogous to Bell Atlantic in that the plaintiff’s 
complaint had not alleged enough facts to establish that 3M was plausibly engaging 
in illegal competition against NicSand in the sandpaper market.173  Also similar to 
Bell Atlantic was the lengthy dissent by Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. accompanying 
the opinion, which argued that “it is difficult to see how any antitrust plaintiff—short 
of those few omniscient plaintiffs that happen to know every relevant factual detail 
before the inception of litigation and without the benefit of discovery—will be able 
to overcome a motion to dismiss.”174  Like Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bell Atlantic, 
                                                          
 
167
 Id.  
 
168
 Id.  Instead, the Court concluded that the complaint could only be read to “plausibly 
suggest that the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating 
terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available 
until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.”  Id.   
 
169
 Id. at 1953. 
 
170
 See NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 461 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 
171
 NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007).  
 
172
 Id. at 451, 455.  
 
173
 Id. at 458.  
 
174
 Id. at 461 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
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Judge Martin argued that the court is moving away from the intention of the Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure by implementing a standard that requires more than mere 
notice.175 
B. Muddled Applications by Federal Courts 
Most district court and Sixth Circuit appellate decisions have acknowledged that 
Conley’s “no set of facts” standard was superseded by Bell Atlantic’s plausibility 
standard, even if the courts are less than certain as to how to apply the new 
standard.176  Yet, some have erroneously continued to reference Conley’s “no set of 
facts” language as if unaware that Bell Atlantic was decided.177  And at least one 
Sixth Circuit decision runs the risk of perpetuating confusion as to the current 
pleading standard in federal courts due to a blending of Conley and Bell Atlantic.  In 
Ferron v. Zoomego, Inc., the Sixth Circuit examined the sufficiency of the complaint 
by a plaintiff who had alleged that the defendant committed unfair or deceptive acts 
in violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA).178  The case was 
heard in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, requiring that the court apply Ohio 
law.  However, as the seminal case Hanna v. Plumer instructs, even when applying 
state law in federal court, the federal court must apply its own procedural rules.179  
Thus, the Sixth Circuit attempted to apply the Bell Atlantic gloss upon Federal Rule 
8, rather than Ohio’s “no set of facts” standard, but instead confused the two by 
construing them together as one standard.  
The court began its analysis of the defendant’s motion to dismiss by stating that 
the court must “determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts 
in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”180  Only a few sentences 
later, the court linked this Conley language to the plausibility standard outlined in 
Bell Atlantic, explaining that, although detailed factual allegations are not necessary, 
                                                          
 
175
 See id. at 460-61. 
 
176
 See United States ex rel. Snapp, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 503 n.6 (6th Cir. 
2008) (acknowledging that “there is some confusion as to when a court should require 
particular facts to be pled, as required by Twombly, and when a court should apply a more 
liberal pleading standard,” but making no mention of Conley); see also CGH Transport, Inc. v. 
Quebecor World, Inc., 261 F. App’x 817, 819 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
abrogated the pleading standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson . . . .”).  
 
177
 See Combs v. Crown Life Ins., No. 1:07-CV-00151, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16702, at 
*4-6 (S.D. Ohio March 4, 2008) (referencing Conley v. Gibson as the proper pleading 
standard without citing to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly at all). 
 
178
 Ferron v. Zoomego, Inc., 276 F. App’x 473 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 
179
 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965) (holding that, in a situation of conflict 
between a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and a State law for service of process, the Federal 
Rule is the valid procedural rule for a federal court to follow when hearing a case under 
diversity jurisdiction).  “To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function 
whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either 
the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’[s] attempt to exercise 
that power in the Enabling Act.”  Id.  
 
180
 Ferron, 276 F. App’x at 475 (emphasis added) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 
249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
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“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”181  The court 
went on to analyze the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged that the defendant 
committed unfair or deceptive acts in violation of Ohio law.182  The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendants transmitted hundreds of e-mail messages to the plaintiff’s 
account, and the plaintiff stated that each message was a “consumer transaction” and 
a “direct solicitation” under Ohio law in violation of OCSPA because each e-mail 
indicated that the plaintiff had won a prize, but failed to fully and clearly disclose the 
terms and obligations necessary to collect the offer.183  In seizing upon the allegation 
that the e-mails were “consumer transactions,” the court held that the “[p]laintiff 
failed to plead sufficient allegations respecting the element of a consumer transaction 
to survive a motion to dismiss.”184  By pleading specific facts that demonstrated that 
the e-mails were “a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance”185 or otherwise 
satisfied the definition of a “consumer transaction” under Ohio law, the court 
affirmed the decision of the district court to not construe this “legal conclusion” as 
true.186  The court concluded, “We are not bound to presume as true Plaintiff’s bald 
legal assertion that Defendants’ e-mail messages to him were ‘consumer 
transactions’ under . . . the OCSPA.”187  
In Ferron, the court clearly applied the Bell Atlantic standard, which requires the 
pleading of facts in support of elements of the allegation to make the claim plausible, 
despite the court’s mistaken reference to the “no set of facts” language of Conley.188  
The federal court was correct in its application of Bell Atlantic due to the procedural 
nature of Rule 8, even though the court would have applied Ohio law to the merits of 
the claim.189  Yet, had the court actually applied the “no set of facts” language of the 
Conley standard, it would likely have come to the opposite conclusion: under notice 
pleading, the complaint would have adequately put the defendant on notice as to the 
plaintiff’s claim and the basis for that claim.  Ferron exemplifies the muddling of the 
pleading standard that has resulted in the wake of Bell Atlantic, as well as the hyper-
technical pleading requirements that may be demanded when Bell Atlantic is applied. 
C. Is Bell Atlantic Creeping into Ohio Courts? 
Ferron demonstrates the shift at the federal level that Bell Atlantic has created 
away from notice pleading and backward into a heightened form of pleading that 
                                                          
 
181
 Id. at 475 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555).  
 
182
 Id. at 475-76.  
 
183
 Id. at 475.  
 
184
 Id. at 476. 
 
185
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 (West 2009).  
 
186
 Ferron, 276 F. App’x at 476. 
 
187
 Id.  
 
188
 While it is true that Conley was not entirely abandoned by the Court in Bell Atlantic, as 
demonstrated by the court’s reference to some language from Conley in Erickson, it is clear 
that the Court specifically disavowed the “no set of facts” language from Conley in Bell 
Atlantic. “The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted 
pleading standard.” Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 563.  
 
189
 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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requires the pleading of facts in order for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.  
Ferron shows that conclusory allegations in a complaint that are unsupported by 
specific facts underlying the allegation are open to attack under the new standard.190  
Although Bell Atlantic’s pleading standard affects only federal courts within Ohio, 
as a former replica of the Federal Rules, federal interpretations of the rules influence 
the Ohio Rules.  Only a few Ohio state courts have applied Bell Atlantic at all, but 
those that have done so have applied the “plausibility” standard in a similarly 
confusing and incorrect fashion just as the Sixth Circuit did in Ferron.191  A quick 
survey of Ohio state courts reveals that the majority of state courts have not strayed 
from Conley after Bell Atlantic; however, the fact that some state courts are 
muddling “plausibility” pleading with Conley threatens the continuation of a pure-
Conley standard in Ohio. 
1. Many State Courts Retain Conley 
While the elusive meaning of Bell Atlantic has caused debate, discussion, and 
controversy among federal district and circuit courts, Ohio’s state courts have 
remained notably silent on the issue until recently.  Most decisions after Bell Atlantic 
reaffirm the low-threshold nature of Conley as the appropriate Ohio pleading 
standard.  For example, in Huffman v. City of Willoughby, an Ohio appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss.192  In explaining the pleading 
standard, the court referenced O’Brien’s use of the Conley language that a complaint 
is sufficient unless it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim.”193  The court noted further that “[a]s long as there is a set of 
facts consistent with the plaintiff’s complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to 
recover, the court may not grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”194  In emphasizing 
the low bar presented by Ohio’s interpretation of Rule 8, the court highlighted that 
                                                          
 
190
 See Richard O. Halloran, The Fact of the Matter: A Return to Fact Pleading?: Viable 
Complaints After Twombly, 44 ARIZ. ATT’Y 20, 24 (2007).  
 
191
 See Gallo v. Westfield Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 91893, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 879, at *P8-9 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (“When granting a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must 
appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief. . . .  
However, the claims set forth in the complaint must be plausible, rather than conceivable.”); 
Williams v. Ohio Edison, No. 92840, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4786, at *P14-15 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2009) (“When granting a motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 12(B)(6), it must appear 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief. . . . However, 
the claims set forth in the complaint must be plausible, rather than conceivable.”); Vagas v. 
City of Hudson, C.A. No. 24713, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 5714, at *P7, *P13 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2009) (quoting the Conley standard but then citing Bell Atlantic for the proposition that 
“conclusory statements in the complaint not supported by facts are not afforded the 
presumption of veracity.”); Parsons v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., No. 93523, 
2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 204, at *P10-11 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (When granting a motion to 
dismiss under Civ. R. 12(B)(6), “it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts entitling [her] to relief. . . . However, the claims set forth in the complaint must be 
plausible, rather than conceivable.”). 
 
192
 Huffman v. City of Willoughby, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6236, at *P52.  
 
193
 Id. at *P18 (citing O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753, 754-55 
(Ohio 1975)) (noting that O’Brien quotes Conley). 
 
194
 Id. (citing Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ohio 2002)).  
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“‘[b]ecause it is so easy for the pleader to satisfy the standard of [Ohio]Civ.R.8(A), 
few complaints are subject to dismissal.’”195  The court affirmed the denial of the 
motion to dismiss due to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint on its face.196  
2. The Eighth Appellate District’s Conley/Bell Atlantic Blend 
No Ohio state court reference Bell Atlantic’s pleading standard at all until March 
of 2009 in Gallo v. Westfield National Insurance Co. when the Ohio Eighth District 
Court of Appeals first applied a version of “plausibility” to pleading standards.197  
Like in Ferron, the court did not abandon Conley’s “no set of facts” language but 
rather linked Conley and Bell Atlantic’s “plausibility” together.198  The same court 
similarly applied the mixed Conley/Bell Atlantic standard again in Williams v. Ohio 
Edison,199 explaining the standard as follows: 
When granting a motion to dismiss under Civ. R. 12(B)(6), “it must 
appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling 
her to relief. . . .  While Williams cannot survive a motion to dismiss 
through the mere incantation of an abstract legal standard, she can defeat 
such a motion if there is some set of facts consistent with her complaint 
that would allow her to recover.  However, the claims set forth in the 
complaint must be plausible, rather than conceivable.  Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly (2007)200.  
The Williams case involved a pro se plaintiff who inartfully drafted a complaint 
alleging thirteen “arguments” that her wages were unconstitutionally garnished to 
satisfy a debt owed to Edison.201  Although the granting of the motion to dismiss was 
proper in this case under either Conley or Bell Atlantic, the case demonstrates the 
confusion that exists as to the correct pleading standard in Ohio.  Absent guidance 
from the Supreme Court of Ohio or amendment to the Ohio Civil Rules of 
Procedure, some courts in Ohio will continue to adhere to Conley, others may switch 
to Bell Atlantic, and others may adopt the Eighth Appellate District’s Conley/Bell 
Atlantic blend.202  
                                                          
 
195
 Id. at *P22 (quoting Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Comm’s Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 698 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994)). 
 
196
 Huffman, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6236, at *P2.  
 
197
 Gallo v. Westfield Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 91893, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 879, at *P9 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2009). 
 
198
 Id. (“However, the claims set forth in the complaint must be plausible, rather than 
conceivable.  Bell Atlantic Corp., v. Twombly (2007) . . . .”). 
 
199
 Williams v. Ohio Ediso, No. 92840, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4786 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2009).  
 
200
 Id. at *P14-*15.  
 
201
 Id. at *P2.  
 
202
 The Eighth Appellate District continues to utilize this unique standard, as all cases 
emerging from the court addressing 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss cite the language articulated 
in Gallo and Williams verbatim.  See Parsons v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit 
Authority, No. 93523, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 204, at *P10-*11 (2010).  
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Numerous post-Bell Atlantic cases in Ohio have continued to reference the “no 
set of facts” language cited in O’Brien203 as the proper standard for evaluating the 
complaint on a motion to dismiss, including ten Ohio Supreme Court cases.204  
However, pressures exist that may tempt Ohio to conform to the federal pleading 
standard.  An increase in defendants filing motions to dismiss and asking the court to 
adopt Bell Atlantic might encourage Ohio courts to lean toward the plausibility test 
and away from Conley’s “no set of facts.”  Those who desire a return to the 
federal/state uniformity that Ohio attempted to achieve when it adopted the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970 could encourage Ohio courts to adopt plausibility 
pleading.  Some judges and practitioners may simply believe that Bell Atlantic is a 
preferable standard that allows complaints doomed to fail later in litigation to be 
weeded out early.  However, none of these reasons are sufficient for Ohio to 
abandon its adherence to the Conley standard.   
VII. OHIO SHOULD NOT ADOPT BELL ATLANTIC 
A. Federal/State Uniformity Will Not Be Achieved by Adopting Bell Atlantic Because 
Ohio Is No Longer a Federal “Replica” 
When Professors Oakley and Coon conducted their key survey of the status of 
federal/state uniformity among states with regard to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1986, Ohio was a federal “replica” that mirrored the Federal Rules in 
                                                          
 
203
 See O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975). 
 
204
 See Volbers-Clarich v. Middletown Management, Inc., No. 2009-933, 2010 Ohio 
LEXIS 1110, at *P12 (Ohio 2010) (“It must appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts entitling her to relief.”); Cundall v. U.S. Bank, 122 Ohio St. 3d 188, 198 (Ohio 
2009) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (“The trial court, reviewing the complaint and nothing else, may 
dismiss the case only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 
entitling the plaintiff to recover.”); Goudlock v. Voorhies, 894 N.E.2d 692, 694 (Ohio 2008) 
(“[I]t appears beyond doubt that he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested 
extraordinary relief in habeas corpus.”); Ohio ex rel. Deiter v. McGuire, 894 N.E.2d 680, 683 
(Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appears beyond doubt that they could prove no set of facts entitling them to 
the requested extraordinary relief in quo warranto and mandamus.”); Ohio ex rel. Agosto v. 
Cuyahoga County Ct. Com. Pl., 894 N.E.2d 314, 315 (Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appears beyond doubt 
that he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief in 
mandamus and procedendo.”); Ohio ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. City of Mayfield Heights, 
891 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appears beyond doubt that Gilmour could prove no set 
of facts warranting the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.”); Keith v. Bobby, 884 
N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appears beyond doubt that he could prove no set of facts 
entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief in habeas corpus.”); Ohio ex rel. Brooks v. 
O’Malley, 884 N.E.2d 42, 44 (Ohio 2008) (“Dismissal of the case is appropriate if, after 
presuming the truth of all of the material factual allegations of Brooks’s complaint and 
making all reasonable inferences in her favor, it appears beyond doubt that Brooks could 
prove no set of facts entitling her to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.”); Rosen 
v. Celebrezze, 883 N.E.2d 420, 425 (Ohio 2008) (“[I]t appeared beyond doubt that [this party] 
could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary writ of prohibition.”); 
Ohio ex rel. Weaver v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 879 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ohio 2007) 
(“Dismissals of mandamus actions based upon the existence of an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law are appropriate as long as it appears beyond doubt that relator can 
prove no set of facts warranting relief.”).  
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all important aspects.205  Since that time, Ohio has varied from the Federal Rules in 
at least nine instances, not including the current difference in pleading standards for 
Rule 8.206  A follow-up study conducted by Professor Oakley in 2002 found that 
Ohio was among several “replica” states tending to move against federal-state 
uniformity.207  The fact that Ohio is no longer a federal replica, and has not been for 
several years, cuts against any argument that Ohio should adopt the pleading 
standard articulated in Bell Atlantic in order to achieve federal/state uniformity.208  
Indeed, the text as well as the standards for interpretation of several rules would have 
to be revisited in order to achieve true alignment with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure again.209  
For example, Rule 4 illustrates a textual and substantive difference that now 
exists between the Ohio Rules and the Federal Rules.210  Ohio Rule 4 gives the 
simple directive that “[s]ervice of summons may be waived in writing by any person 
entitled thereto under Rule 4.2 who is at least eighteen years of age and not under 
                                                          
 
205
 Oakley & Coon, supra note 31, at 1413.  
 
206
 John B. Oakley, Perspectives on Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: A 
Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 355-56 (2002/2003).  The 
eight rules in Ohio discussed by Oakley that no longer align with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, either textually or by interpretation, include Rules 4, 11, 16, 26, 30, 33, 45, and 50.  
Id. at 369-70.   
Additionally, the Federal Rule concerning voluntary dismissal is different from Ohio’s Rule 
concerning voluntary dismissal.  Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows service of “a notice of 
dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary 
judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) (West 2009).  Ohio Rule 41(A)(1)(a) is more liberal 
and permits “filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the commencement of trial unless 
a counterclaim which cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court has 
been served by that defendant.” OHIO R. CIV. P. 41(A)(1)(a) (West 2009).  For an engaging 
discussion about the disparity between these two standards, see S. Ben Barnes, Voluntary 
Dismissal in Ohio: A Tale of an Ancient Procedure in a Modern World, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
921 (2009). 
 
207
 Oakley, supra note 181, at 356, 369-70.  
 
208
 At least one Ohio state court decision supports an argument that courts believe they 
should adopt Bell Altantic in order to “maintain” federal-state uniformity .  In Vagas v. 
Hudson, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Ninth District cited the “no set of facts” language 
and Bell Atlantic as being applicable to determining what is required by Rule 8.  Vagas v. 
Hudson, C.A. No. 24713, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 5714, *P13, n.1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).  In a 
footnote, the court explained it’s reference to Bell Atlantic:  “Although Twombly refers to the 
Federal Rules and the Ohio Rules are applicable here, the pleading requirements under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and Civ.R. 8(A) are virtually identical.  Additionally, the Ohio Rule was 
based on the Federal Rule.”  Id. at n.1.  
 
209
 See id. at 369-70.  The differences outlined in this section discuss substantive 
differences beyond any textual differences that may exist between the Ohio and Federal Rules 
due to the recent amendments to the text of the Federal Rules that went into effect December 
1, 2007.  The 2007 amendments were specifically textual in nature, and were only intended to 
clarify the rules stylistically and implement consistent terminology.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4 
(West 2009) (Notes of Advisory Committee on 2007 Amendments). 
 
210
 OHIO R. CIV. P. 4(D) (West 2009); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d). 
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disability.”211  However, Federal Rule 4 includes lengthy instructions on how to 
request a waiver,212 the consequences of failing to waive,213 the time to answer after 
a waiver,214 the results of filing a waiver,215 and a note that waiver of service of 
summons does not waive objection to personal jurisdiction or venue.216  Ohio did not 
adopt these federal provisions included in the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule 
4(d), creating textual and substantive differences between the federal and state Rules 
of Civil Procedure regarding waiver of the service of summons.217   
Similarly, Rule 11 presents differences in the text of the Ohio and Federal Rules 
as well as differences in interpretations of the Rules.218  Both Ohio and Federal Rule 
11 attempt to prevent frivolous litigation, which abuses and undermines the court 
system, by requiring parties to sign the pleadings and permitting courts to impose 
sanctions on an attorney or a pro se party.219  However, the federal and state courts 
in Ohio use different tests to determine whether sanctions under Rule 11 are 
appropriate.220  In interpreting Rule 11, federal courts impose an objective standard 
to determine whether an attorney has filed a frivolous pleading.221  Ohio state courts 
apply a subjective standard to determine if the pleading is well grounded.222  This 
difference in interpretation between Ohio’s federal and state courts has existed for 
decades and is analogous to the situation presented by the competing federal and 
state interpretations of Rule 8 pleadings.   
Just as different standards in Ohio’s federal and state courts surrounding the 
interpretation of Rule 11 co-exist, so too may differing interpretations of Rule 8 
survive side by side in Ohio’s state and federal court systems.  Ohio need not feel 
compelled to adopt the Bell Atlantic standard out of a fear that the Ohio Rules will 
no longer be in sync with its Federal counterpart.  Rather, as noted by Professor 
                                                          
 
211
 OHIO R. CIV. P. 4(D). 
 
212
 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1). 
 
213
 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2). 
 
214
 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3). 
 
215
 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4). 
 
216
 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(5). 
 
217
 Oakley, supra note 181, at 369.  
 
218
 OHIO R. CIV. P. 11 (West 2009); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (West 2009). 
 
219
 Stephen R. Ripps, Ohio Civil Rule 11: Time for Change, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 
133 (1994).  
 
220
 Id.  
 
221
 See Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the attorney 
had a duty to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing a pleading, and that 
asserting a claim before ascertaining whether the claim had any basis in fact violated that 
duty, requiring that sanctions be imposed under Federal Rule 11). 
 
222
 See Haubeil & Sons Asphalt & Materials, Inc. v. Brewer & Brewer Sons, Inc., 565 
N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (emphasizing that a signature under Ohio Rule 11 
represents that “to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to 
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay”; only willful violations of the rule will result 
in sanctions). 
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Oakley, Ohio has chosen to diverge from the Federal Rules in multiple instances 
since its adoption of the Rules in 1970.223  Choosing to ignore Bell Atlantic is 
consistent with Ohio’s current trend of moving away from federal/state uniformity.  
Additionally, continued accessibility to the court system by plaintiffs—especially at 
the local and state level—supports maintaining the lower-threshold presented by 
Conley as a pleading standard.   
B. Forum Shopping Is Unlikely and, Should It Occur, Can Be Mitigated 
Some might advocate in favor of Ohio adopting Bell Atlantic’s plausibility 
standard for fear of forum shopping due to the differing standards between federal 
and state courts.  Arguably, plaintiffs with a choice between filing in Ohio state or 
federal court would choose to file in Ohio state court due to the lower, true notice 
pleading threshold embodied by Conley.  However, Ohio’s continuation of Conley is 
unlikely to result in forum shopping due to a mechanism that assists defendants in 
having the case be heard by a federal court and the complaint subsequently tested 
against the Bell Atlantic standard: Removal.224   
Removal allows a defendant to transfer a state-court case to the federal court in 
certain circumstances.225  Aside from a few situations in which claims are not 
removable to federal court,226 most claims brought in Ohio state courts that present 
issues that initially could have been brought in federal courts may be properly 
removed by a defendant to federal court.227  Forum shopping is unlikely to occur 
among the subset of plaintiffs who have claims under federal law or mixed state and 
federal claims implicating supplemental jurisdiction any more than has already 
occurred due to the other non-alignments of the Ohio Rules with the Federal Rules.  
Differences in Ohio and Federal civil procedure have continually evolved since 
                                                          
 
223
 See Oakley, supra note 181, at 355. 
 
224
 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).  The statute provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action 
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original 
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court 
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such 
action is pending. . . . 
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a 
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall 
be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.  Any other 
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined 
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. 
 
225
 See id. 
 
226
  Three general exceptions to removal exist.  First, state courts are given exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain federal claims, such as the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 
1991.  See Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Commc’ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1150 (4th 
Cir. 1997).  Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1445 explicitly designates that certain claims are not 
removable to federal courts if brought under certain federal statutes or workmen’s 
compensation laws.  28 U.S.C. § 1445.  Finally, even if a defendant asserts a federal defense 
to a state-law claim, the defendant will be unable to remove the case to federal court under the 
well-pleaded complaint rule.  See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 
152-53 (1908).  
 
227
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  
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1970, reflecting procedural and policy preferences by the state.  And even if a 
plaintiff initially attempts to secure what he or she perceives to be the more 
favorable arena of the state court, the defendant’s interests will not be prejudiced due 
to the availability of removal.   
It is true that Ohio state courts provide a favorable arena for plaintiffs due to the 
fact that notice pleading thrives in Ohio under Conley.  To stick with Conley means 
that plaintiffs in Ohio—many of whom have claims implicating only Ohio law—will 
be able to access the court systems easily.  Access to the court system is imperative 
for a just society, and indeed, the Supreme Court of Ohio has emphasized that 
Ohio’s “public policy supports free, unhampered access to the courts for litigants.”228  
Such unhampered access would be jeopardized for all plaintiffs with claims under 
Ohio law if the state were to adopt Bell Atlantic’s vague plausibility standard.  Even 
if a marked increase in the filing of complaints at the state-level were to occur, the 
slight administrative burdens of processing removal requests do not outweigh the 
negative effects Bell Atlantic’s plausibility standard will have on pleading and 
accessibility to the courts in Ohio generally. 
C.  Bell Atlantic’s Heightened Plausibility Pleading Standard Is Undesirable 
As alluded to throughout this Note, Bell Atlantic does not present a favorable 
alternative to the Conley standard.  Having been characterized as “one of the Court’s 
most important procedural decisions of the last decade,” Bell Atlantic caught 
litigators, scholars, and judges off-guard.229  The fragmented interpretations of its 
implications on pleading standards, which have resulted in its wake, have created 
great uncertainty in an area of civil procedure that was previously straightforward 
and predictable under Conley.230  
Bell Atlantic presents a vague plausibility standard that moves away from notice 
pleading, which was the cornerstone of the liberalism embodied in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.231  As one irked judge and scholar has noted, the text of “Rule 8 
does not require a short and plain statement of the facts underlying a claim.”232  Yet, 
Bell Atlantic asks plaintiffs to plead just that.  The very word “plausible,” which is 
central to the Bell Atlantic standard, is not defined by the Court.233  This may explain 
the numerous interpretations of “plausibility” that have resulted.234  Iqbal offered 
                                                          
 
228
 Crawford v. Euclid Nat’l Bank, 483 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Ohio 1985). 
 
229
 See McMahon, supra note 118, at 852 (“Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly was probably 
the least anticipated decision to come out of the 2007 Supreme Court.  It also happens to be 
one of the Court’s most important procedural decisions of the last decade, with massive 
implications for civil litigation.”). 
 
230
 See id. at 853 (“We district court judges suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves 
puzzled over something we thought we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a 
motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim.”).  
 
231
 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1202 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).  
 
232
 McMahon, supra note 118, at 853 (emphasis added).  
 
233
 See Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 557-58. 
 
234
 Compare United States v. Harchar, No. 1:06-cv-2927, 2007 WL 1876510, at *2 (N.D. 
Ohio June 28, 2007) (“Twombly merely held that a complaint that alleged only parallel 
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little helpful guidance when it tried to explain “plausible”: “[D]etermining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court 
to draw on its experience and common sense.”235  Indeed, if “common sense” is the 
guide for plausibility, then courts are likely to continue to “inevitably exhibit 
different levels of tolerance” for the level of detail necessary to properly assert 
factual allegations.236   
Before tossing their own interpretations of “plausibility” into the ring of other 
interpretations, Ohio courts should ask themselves this: If Bell Atlantic had never 
been decided, would they have considered abandoning Conley’s “no set of facts” 
pleading standard at all?  Echoing Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bell Atlantic, none of 
the Supreme Court of Ohio’s more than one hundred decisions utilizing the “no set 
of facts” pleading standard seem to “question[],” “criticize,” or express that they are  
“puzzl[ed]” by the “no set of facts” language.237  Indeed, the frequency with which 
the language has been used suggests just the opposite: Until recently, Ohio had a 
well-understood and time-honored pleading standard under Conley.  There appears 
to be little advantage to entering the tempest surrounding Bell Atlantic unprovoked.   
Another problem with plausibility pleading under Bell Atlantic is one that Justice 
Stevens emphasized in his extensive dissent.238  Like the claim at issue in Bell 
Atlantic, many claims will now require the pleading of facts that are not in the 
control of the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint.239  When discovery is 
necessary to uncover the facts that support the claim, Bell Atlantic will prevent 
plaintiffs from having their day in court unless they are “omniscient.”240  Discovery 
and case management are pre-trial procedures better suited for the weeding out of 
meritless claims rather than the pleading stage.241 
                                                          
conduct did not state a claim for an antitrust conspiracy.  The Supreme Court did not purport 
to change the applicable 12(b)(6) standards . . .”) with CGH Transp., Inc. v. Quebecor World, 
Inc., 261 F. App’x 817, 819 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court abrogated the 
pleading standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson”); see also supra Part IV.  
 
235
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009). 
 
236
 McMahon, supra note 118, at 867. 
 
237
 Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 577-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Since adopting Conley’s “no set 
of facts” language in O’Brien in 1975, the Supreme Court of Ohio has cited the “no set of 
facts” language in 129 decisions based on a search through LexisNexis. 
http://www.lexisnexis.com (search “Find a Source” for “OH Supreme Court Cases from 
1821;” then search “no set of facts”).  Not a single case appears to question the validity of that 
language.  Quite to the contrary, it appears to have become part of Ohio’s common parlance 
regarding the review of a motion to dismiss.  
 
238
 Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 570 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 
239
 Id. at 572 (stating “instead of requiring knowledgeable executives . . . to respond to 
these allegations by way of sworn depositions or other limited discovery—and indeed without 
so much as requiring petitioners to file an answer denying that they entered into any 
agreement—the majority permits immediate dismissal based on the assurances of company 
lawyers that nothing untoward was afoot”). 
 
240
 Nicsand, 507 F.3d at 461 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 
241
 See Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Indeed, rather than reducing case-load management at the trial court level, 
imposing a plausibility standard within Ohio courts will likely increase the filing of 
motions to dismiss by defendants who are encouraged by the heightened standard as 
presented in Bell Atlantic.242  Under Conley, Ohio courts may continue to evaluate a 
complaint to determine whether it states a claim for which relief may be granted 
under 12(B)(6) as it has for the past thirty years.243  The low-threshold presented by 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language will ensure that plaintiffs—at least at the state 
level—will usually be given the chance to have their claim heard.  And, state judges, 
litigants, and plaintiffs will be spared the uncertainty of construing what is 
sufficiently “plausible” to survive a motion to dismiss in the absence of meaningful 
guidance from the Court.  Faced with the decision to align with the federal pleading 
standard or maintain its independence, Ohio should choose to take the path of 
pretending that Bell Atlantic and Iqbal simply do not exist.244 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Notice pleading is not dead.  Although the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic 
explicitly avowed that it was not imposing a heightened pleading standard,245 it is 
difficult to ignore the shift away from notice pleading embodied by the new 
plausibility standard.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal confirmed the sea-change in pleading 
standards, but merely provided additional evidence as to why it is a step in the wrong 
direction away from notice pleading.  While only the wraiths of notice pleading may 
remain in federal courts—especially those that have construed Bell Atlantic’s 
plausibility standard strictly—notice pleading can still be saved in the state courts of 
Ohio.   
Must Ohio retire Conley from its prominent and well-weathered position as the 
pleading standard for Ohio?  No.  Just as Ohio has chosen over the years to vary 
from its Federal Rule counterparts in other areas of procedure, the difference in 
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint that now exists between federal and state 
courts in Ohio demonstrates a difference in procedural values.  By maintaining 
Conley, Ohio state courts will underscore a preference for clarity, tradition, the use 
of discovery as the vehicle for weeding out meritless claims, unhampered access to 
the courts by plaintiffs, and keeping notice pleading—the foundation of our 
procedural system—alive.   
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 See McMahon, supra note 118, at 868 (commenting that “[t]he Supreme Court may 
have thought it was providing relief to the federal docket by making it easier to dismiss 
complaints, but that will not be the result” due to the increased number of motions to dismiss 
that will be filed and the potential complexity of interpreting them that may emerge).  
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 See generally O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 
1975). 
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 See supra Part IV. 
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 Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 570. 
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